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Co-signer Spending Policies draft v2.1 adds signed finality

Draft v2.1 of Co-signer Spending Policies (Nov 8, 2026) makes co-signers refuse any policy with unknown, duplicate or missing fields. It also adds a finality flag to oracle statements and corrects the k-of-n safety rule. Co-signer and oracle developers should check their parsers against these rules.

Co-signer Spending Policies draft v2.1 adds signed finality
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Luke Carriere published draft v2.1 of Co-signer Spending Policies on November 8, 2026, two days after Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #430 summarized v2. It adds strict rules for how co-signers validate a policy, a signed finality flag for oracle statements and a corrected k-of-n safety condition. Teams building lending, vault or escrow co-signers and DLC oracles should check their parsers against these rules and give input on the serialization format, which is still undecided.

The draft was the second news item in the Optech recap podcast of November 10. Carriere joined hosts Mark "Murch" Erhardt, Gustavo Flores Echaiz and Mike Schmidt, and the segment starts at 30:51. The other guests were 0xB10C, on TCP hole punching for home nodes, and Sjors Provoost, on his opt-in replay protection prototype. The episode page still lists the transcript as "transcription coming soon".

What Co-signer Spending Policies v2.1 changes since Newsletter #430

A co-signer that signs only when a condition holds can emulate a covenant on today's Bitcoin. Products and designs that already do this, from Liquidium and Lendasat to Halseth's blinded co-signers, each define their own policy format. So a wallet built for one cannot use the co-signer or oracle built for another. The draft defines one shared format. Draft v2 (dated October 5) splits a policy into five parts:

  • output: a Taproot tr() descriptor with miniscript leaves
  • co-signer group: who co-signs and how many must sign
  • templates: the exact transactions the co-signers may sign
  • conditions: what must be true before each template can be signed
  • profiles: how the co-signer verifies a spend and which evidence it accepts

The policy ID is a BIP340 tagged hash of the policy's canonical serialization.

Newsletter #430 reported two review comments. PREDGE noted that the statement-v0 evidence profile has no finality flag, so a co-signer could act on an oracle answer that is later corrected. tehiyadu said the policy hash should commit to the exact rules a verifier applies, not just to a document that parses. Version 2.1 (commit c21ed45) answers both points.

Itemv2 (Oct 5)v2.1 (Nov 8)
Policy ID tagCSP/policyCSP/policy/v0, with the format version as the first field in the hashed bytes
Unknown fieldsNot definedPolicy is invalid; a co-signer MUST refuse to sign
Duplicate keysNot definedPolicy is invalid
DefaultsNot definedNone; every field is serialized explicitly
statement-v0 signed dataEvent ID, outcome, timestampAdds a finality flag that evidence conditions can require
k-of-n safetyThreshold group "needs k honest ones to block an invalid spend"An invalid spend is blocked when at least n−k+1 co-signers refuse
SerializationJSON or TLV, openStill open; the author leans toward a hybrid
Test vectors and reference codeNot availableStill not available

Status as of November 12: this is an unnumbered discussion draft in the author's own repository. Carriere says he is not asking for a BIP number. No consensus change is needed: wallets that support Taproot descriptors, miniscript and PSBTs can already hold these outputs.

Who the threshold fix and the stricter validation affect

Threshold co-signer groups. The draft describes Liquidium and Lendasat as pairing a 2-of-3 multisig with oracle-driven settlement. For 2-of-3, n−k+1 equals 2, the same as k, so v2's wording happened to give the right number. For other thresholds the two numbers differ. In a 2-of-5 group, 4 co-signers must refuse to block a bad spend. In a 4-of-5 group, 2 are enough. In our assessment, v2's wording overstated the safety of low-threshold groups and understated the safety of high-threshold ones. The trade-off between the two group types stays the same. In an aggregate MuSig2 group, one honest co-signer can block an invalid spend, but one offline co-signer also blocks a valid spend.

Parser authors. Rejecting unknown fields conflicts with existing code. Lightning TLV code ignores unknown odd types by default, and Carriere notes that this behavior must be turned off for v2.1. Common JSON parsers silently keep the last of two duplicate keys, which v2.1 must reject. Canonical JSON (RFC 8785) also needs extra rules for large integers and Unicode. The hybrid option computes the policy ID only over strict TLV and adds a JSON view for reading and editing that is never hashed. Its cost is two formats to specify and test.

Oracle operators. Every co-signer must accept dlc-v0 attestations. DLC attestations that use nonce pre-commitment are already effectively final, because signing two outcomes for one event reveals the oracle's key. The new flag matters for statement-v0 attestors who settle human-decided events, such as escrow delivery.

Checklist for a co-signer or oracle targeting draft v2.1

  1. Reject any policy that has an unknown field, a duplicate key or a missing field, and refuse to sign under it.
  2. Compute the policy ID with the tag CSP/policy/v0, with the format version first in the hashed bytes. Keep CSP tags separate from BIP340 and BIP341 tags.
  3. In escrow templates, require a final statement-v0 attestation, or wait out a dispute window if the attestor never marks finality.
  4. Recalculate your group's safety as n−k+1 refusals needed to block a bad spend, and k co-signers online to sign a good one.
  5. If you reuse Lightning TLV code, turn off the rule that ignores unknown odd types.
  6. In open-v0 mode, give every participant a signing record with the policy ID, transaction ID, template and evidence used.

The tagged hash itself is the standard BIP340 construction. Only the input bytes are undecided:

python
import hashlib

def tagged_hash(tag: str, msg: bytes) -> bytes:
    t = hashlib.sha256(tag.encode()).digest()
    return hashlib.sha256(t + t + msg).digest()

# canonical_policy_bytes: format still open (TLV, JSON or hybrid)
policy_id = tagged_hash("CSP/policy/v0", canonical_policy_bytes)

Caveats in the v2.1 draft

The full wire schema, the exact-byte test vectors and a reference implementation are unfinished, so any policy ID computed today may change once a serialization is chosen. The blinded-v0 and enclave-v0 verification modes are still "to be specified". The author says the format does not make co-signers trustless. It only standardizes their rules so that anyone can inspect them. He sets two independent implementations agreeing on every policy ID and every accept-or-reject decision as the test for calling it a standard.

TAGSCo-signer Spending PoliciesDLC oraclesCovenantsTaproot
Grounded sources6 REFS
  1. [01]Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #430 Recap Podcastbitcoinops.org ↗
  2. [02]Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #430bitcoinops.org ↗
  3. [03][BIP Draft] Co-signer Spending Policies (Delving Bitcoin)delvingbitcoin.org ↗
  4. [04]BIP Draft v2: Co-signer Spending Policies (commit 468fdd1)github.com ↗
  5. [05]bitcoindev: Co-signer Spending Policies draft and v2.1 announcementgroups.google.com ↗
  6. [06]BIP340: Schnorr Signatures for secp256k1 (tagged hashes)github.com ↗
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