OpenVM v2.1.0 adds certified STARK verifier, fixes 5 advisories
OpenVM v2.1.0 adds optional STARK proof verification with a Lean-certified Swirl verifier and patches five advisories, two rated High. Upgrade from 1.x or 2.0.x, rebuild your guests and check any custom algebra types.
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Key takeaways
- GHSA-6p9w-9j7q-867r (High): the transpiler turned RISC-V UNIMP, which LLVM uses for abort paths, into a no-op. Execution could continue past the abort and still produce a valid proof.
- GHSA-5f24-43wm-7gr2 (High): std guests that returned Err or a nonzero ExitCode were reported as successful.
- Three Moderate advisories cover noncanonical values in the k256/p256 helpers, PublicKey::from_affine and point decompression. All are fixed in 2.1.0.
- Code that implements IntMod or WeierstrassPoint must now provide *_unchecked byte accessors, and point coordinates must implement CanonicalRepr.
OpenVM v2.1.0 was released on November 4, 2026. It adds optional STARK proof verification with a certified Swirl verifier and fixes five GitHub security advisories, two of them rated High. Anyone running OpenVM from 1.0.0 through 2.0.2 should upgrade to 2.1.0, rebuild their guest programs and check any custom algebra or curve types against the new trait rules.
What changed in v2.1.0
The release notes describe two parts: one new feature and a set of security and correctness fixes "across the verifier, cryptographic guest libraries, transpiler, and toolchain."
Certified verification. The SDK and CLI can now verify STARK proofs with "the certified Swirl verifier extracted from its Lean formalization." The feature is optional. The team also changed the recursion and continuation circuits' interactions and constraints "for formal verification." In addition, key generation now treats every verifier circuit AIR as required.
Security fixes. The release closes five advisories. Each one lists 2.1.0 as the patched version:
| Advisory | Severity | Affected versions | Problem |
|---|---|---|---|
| GHSA-5f24-43wm-7gr2 | High | >= 1.0.0, <= 2.0.2 | Guest startup ignores failures from Rust std main |
| GHSA-6p9w-9j7q-867r | High | >= 1.0.0, <= 2.0.2 | RV32IM transpilation can let execution continue past abort instructions |
| GHSA-3c6x-fcmq-fm7v | Moderate | >= 1.3.0, <= 2.0.2 | k256/p256 point and scalar helpers accept noncanonical values |
| GHSA-hf63-jcf3-9wm8 | Moderate | >= 1.3.0, <= 2.0.2 | Public-key construction does not require a canonical y coordinate |
| GHSA-3fv9-jqjf-qp93 | Moderate | >= 1.3.0, <= 2.0.2 | A noncanonical selected root can change point decompression results |
The two High issues both make a failing guest look like a successful one. In the transpiler, every CSRRW x0, csr, x0 was treated as a no-op. RISC-V UNIMP uses that same encoding (0xc0001073), and LLVM emits it on abort and trap paths. The advisory warns that guests that rely on abort as a security check "can execute an otherwise unreachable continuation and produce a successful proof." Version 2.1.0 rejects unsupported SYSTEM/CSR instructions, including LLVM's UNIMP trap.
In the toolchain, guest startup threw away the status code from Rust's std main wrapper. A guest whose main returned Err or a nonzero ExitCode therefore ended with a success status. Version 2.1.0 treats "nonzero return statuses from Rust's std main wrapper as failures."
The Moderate fixes add canonical-value checks to the guest libraries:
- Values must now be reduced before modular and point byte access and before Serde serialization. Native checks panic on noncanonical values.
- Point decompression checks that the selected root is reduced before it tests parity.
PublicKey::from_affinechecks that both coordinates are reduced before it checks for the identity point.ct_eqinff_derive,k256andp256now compares field and scalar values modulo their modulus.ff_derivenow encodes and decodes correctly when the representation size and storage size differ, in both byte orders. Invalid encodings now returnNoneinstead of panicking.
The prover also fixes "program-trace padding PC collisions in sparse programs on CPU and CUDA." Padding now goes after the original program slots.
Who is affected
Everyone who proves Rust guests with std. If your guest reports a failed check by returning Err from main, older versions could prove that run as a success. A verifier or application that only checks for successful termination could then accept a computation that should have failed.
Guests that use abort or panic as a guard. How exposed you are depends on the code the compiler generated after the trap. The advisory rates this High because the result is a valid proof of a path that should never run.
Users of the k256, p256 and ECC guest libraries. This covers signature verification, public-key parsing and compressed-point handling, mainly on 1.3.0 and later. Before 2.1.0, a value outside the canonical range could compare as equal to a different value, or decompress to a different point. Applications that dedupe, hash or compare keys inside a guest are the ones most likely to be hit.
Library authors. If you implement IntMod or WeierstrassPoint for your own types, this release breaks your code. You must add *_unchecked byte accessors, and your point coordinates must implement CanonicalRepr.
What to do now
- Move the OpenVM CLI, SDK and guest crates to the
v2.1.0tag. Prebuilt binaries for several platforms are attached to the GitHub release. - Rebuild and transpile every guest with the 2.1.0 toolchain. The transpiler and startup fixes only apply to newly built ELF files.
- Search your guests for
mainfunctions that returnResultorExitCode. Inputs that should fail must now produce a failed run, so add a test for at least one of them. - If a build fails to transpile after the upgrade, look for unsupported SYSTEM/CSR instructions. A
UNIMPtrap that compiled under 2.0.x is now rejected. - Update custom
IntModandWeierstrassPointimplementations with the new*_uncheckedaccessors andCanonicalRepr. - Code that decodes
ff_derivefields should handle the newNonereturn value instead of relying on a panic. - Regenerate your proving and verifying keys and redeploy any verifiers. The recursion and continuation constraints changed, and all verifier AIRs are now required at key generation. The release notes do not say whether 2.0.x keys still work, so do not assume they do.
- To use the certified Swirl verifier, enable it in the SDK or CLI. It is off by default.
The full diff is in the v2.0.1...v2.1.0 comparison on GitHub.
Caveats
The OpenVM maintainers assigned all five severity ratings, and no advisory has a CVE ID. The Lean-certified Swirl verifier is optional, and the release notes do not say whether it will become the default.
One related research note: IACR ePrint 2026/2754, "A note on zero-knowledge ring switching", was posted on the same day as the release.
- [01]openvm-org/openvm v2.1.0 release notesgithub.com ↗
- [02]GHSA-6p9w-9j7q-867r: RV32IM transpilation can continue past abort instructionsgithub.com ↗
- [03]GHSA-5f24-43wm-7gr2: Rust std main failures ignored by guest startupgithub.com ↗
- [04]GHSA-3c6x-fcmq-fm7v: k256/p256 helpers observe noncanonical representationsgithub.com ↗
- [05]OpenVM v2.0.1...v2.1.0 full changeloggithub.com ↗
- [06]A note on zero-knowledge ring switching (IACR ePrint 2026/2754)eprint.iacr.org ↗
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