---
title: "RISC Zero zkVM 3.1.0 fixes Groth16 claim forgery and four other flaws"
url: https://blog.b3pay.net/risc-zero-zkvm-3-1-0-fixes-groth16-claim-forgery-and-four-other-flaws
desk: ZK Tech
published_at: 2026-11-11T15:34:42.434Z
machine_written: true
read_token: mwkq7z5x.XemhKOylSgcC4OciLbfTkBlMqONyK3ftVHuP4nzd1PI
read_token_expires_at: 2026-11-18T13:26:50.565Z
---

# RISC Zero zkVM 3.1.0 fixes Groth16 claim forgery and four other flaws

> risc0-zkvm 3.1.0 fixes five proof-system bugs, including one that let a single valid Groth16 receipt be reused to forge any claim. Upgrade the toolchain, regenerate all receipts and verify through the new 0xe71e6620 verifier.

Key points:
- Every RiscZeroGroth16Verifier built for the old circuits, 3.0.0 and earlier, accepts forged proofs; the advisory rates it Critical.
- Receipts do not verify across 3.0 and 3.1 in either direction: new circuits, control root and Groth16 setup 2026-10-20.1.
- Router users need no contract change; direct callers must switch to the 3.1.0 verifier, and Katana mainnet has none deployed yet.
- RiscZeroSetVerifier 0.9.0 is emergency-stopped and set aggregation is deprecated, with no 3.1 set verifier.

RISC Zero released `risc0-zkvm` 3.1.0 on 10 November 2026 with fixes for five soundness and zero-knowledge bugs, the worst of which let anyone holding one valid Groth16 receipt get an arbitrary claim accepted. Every team that generates or verifies RISC Zero receipts, on-chain or off-chain, must upgrade, regenerate receipts and move to the new `RiscZeroGroth16Verifier` (selector `0xe71e6620`), because "There is no workaround."

## Five bugs fixed in risc0-zkvm 3.1.0 and the zirgen circuits

The release notes list five fixes. Together they touch every receipt format: composite, succinct, Groth16 and on-chain. Three advisories go with them: GHSA-g6qg-9j8p-7j87 (risc0), GHSA-qvmf-qrrq-p2w4 (zirgen) and GHSA-mm6c-35cm-g4x2 (risc0-ethereum, rated Critical).

1. **Groth16 claim substitution (critical).** Two bit decompositions were under-constrained on the path from the proof to the public claim digest. In `stark_verify.circom`, the 32 output limbs packed into the claim digest had no range check. In the recursion circuit, `BIT_AND_ELEM` split inputs into 31 bits but only checked the result modulo the Baby Bear prime, so some inputs had a second valid split. With one honest Groth16 receipt, an attacker could swap in a different image ID, journal and exit code.
2. **Poseidon254 S-box.** The Poseidon hash inside the Groth16 wrapper used `x^8`, which is 8-to-1 over BN254 and not a permutation. That breaks collision resistance for the Merkle commitments and Fiat-Shamir transcript of the STARK being wrapped. The S-box is now `x^7`.
3. **Two executions in one trace.** The rv32im circuit did not limit how many `isFirstCycle` rows a trace could have. A prover could put two executions in one trace and let a memory read in one return a value written by the other. That skips the guest's own checks. The circuit now commits to a public trace length, and verifiers check it against the proof size.
4. **Unchecked `sys_read` words.** Host-supplied words were written to guest memory without checking that each half fits in 16 bits. Each half-word is now constrained.
5. **Weak zero-knowledge padding.** The recursion prover filled its padding rows with one random element repeated in every cell. This weakened privacy for succinct and Groth16 receipts. It does not affect soundness.

## Who is exposed by the RISC Zero 3.1.0 advisories, and what the upgrade breaks

The Groth16 bug matters most for anyone who verifies receipts on an EVM chain. The risc0-ethereum advisory says the Solidity verifier is correct for the circuit it was built for. The flaw is in the circuits, so every `RiscZeroGroth16Verifier` built for them, versions 3.0.0 and earlier, accepts forged proofs. A rollup, bridge or coprocessor app that trusts a journal from such a verifier could be fed a forged journal by anyone able to produce one valid receipt. In my assessment, that is a low bar wherever provers are untrusted.

Bug 3 matters even for off-chain users who only use composite or succinct receipts. A guest that checks a signature or a factorization before it commits an output was not safe against a malicious prover.

The fix is a hard break. The rv32im seal format and circuit ID changed, and the control root is new. The Groth16 trusted setup (2026-10-20.1) and its verifying key are new too. Receipts do not verify across the 3.0 to 3.1 line in either direction. Release PR #3831 calls the new setup "single-party". My assessment: teams that cared about the trust model of the earlier Groth16 parameters should note this change.

| Integration | Status after 3.1.0 | What you must change |
|---|---|---|
| Contract calls `RiscZeroVerifierRouter` | 3.1.0 verifier (`0xe71e6620`) already routed. 2.2.0 (`0xbb001d44`) and 3.0.0 (`0x73c457ba`) will be emergency-stopped after a delay | No contract change. Send receipts made with `risc0-zkvm` 3.1.0 |
| Contract calls a `RiscZeroGroth16Verifier` address directly | Old addresses accept forged proofs | Point to the 3.1.0 address in `contracts/deployment.toml` |
| `RiscZeroSetVerifier` 0.9.0 (`0x242f9d5b`) | Emergency-stopped on Ethereum, Sepolia, Base, Base Sepolia. Set aggregation is deprecated, and there is no 3.1 set verifier | Stop accepting inclusion proofs against cached roots, and drop set aggregation |
| Katana mainnet | No 3.1.0 verifier deployed | Once 3.0.0 is stopped, the router there has no Groth16 verifier |
| Off-chain Rust verifier | Old receipts fail under 3.1.0 | Bump crates and re-prove |

Do not hard-code `0x8b38038c`: it was an earlier 3.1.0 deployment, replaced before release and already stopped.

## Upgrade checklist for risc0-zkvm 3.1.0

1. Install the matching toolchain. An older `r0vm` proves with the old circuits:

```bash
rzup install cargo-risczero 3.1.0
rzup install r0vm 3.1.0
# only if you shrink-wrap to Groth16 on CUDA (component 0.2.0)
rzup install risc0-groth16
```

2. Bump the crates in your Cargo manifest. The circuit crates move to 4.1.0, and `risc0-groth16`, `risc0-zkp` and `risc0-binfmt` move to 3.0.6:

```diff
 [dependencies]
-risc0-zkvm = "3.0.6"
+risc0-zkvm = "3.1.0"
-risc0-ethereum-contracts = "3.0.0"
+risc0-ethereum-contracts = "3.1.0"
```

The old versions above are examples; the new ones come from the release notes and the advisory.

3. Without CUDA, make sure provers can pull the Docker image `risczero/risc0-groth16-prover:v2026-10-20.1`. This image runs the shrink-wrap step.
4. Regenerate every receipt you store or relay: composite, succinct and Groth16. Receipts from 3.0.x will not verify.
5. If you call a verifier address directly, switch it to the 3.1.0 `RiscZeroGroth16Verifier` (selector `0xe71e6620`). If you use the router (addresses per chain are in the RISC Zero Verifier Contracts docs), make sure your prover sends 3.1.0 receipts before 2.2.0 and 3.0.0 are stopped.
6. If you integrated `RiscZeroSetVerifier` 0.9.0 directly, reject proofs against roots it cached earlier.
7. Pin versions in CI. RISC Zero says all earlier versions of the affected crates will be yanked from crates.io after a delay, so unpinned builds of old versions will start to fail.

The release PR also adds an `evm_receipt` example. It proves a guest to Groth16 and writes the arguments for the EVM verifier's `verify(bytes,bytes32,bytes32)` as JSON, so you can check a new receipt against the deployed contracts.

## Open questions in the RISC Zero 3.1.0 rollout

The notes give no exact dates for stopping the 2.2.0 and 3.0.0 verifiers or yanking the old crates. They only say "after a suitable delay." The advisories do not say whether anyone exploited these bugs, and there is no CVE ID. Katana mainnet users have no 3.1.0 Groth16 verifier yet. Because the control root and Groth16 verifying key both changed, any verifier parameters you pinned yourself need updating along with the receipts.

## Sources

1. [risc0/risc0 v3.1.0 release notes](https://github.com/risc0/risc0/releases/tag/v3.1.0)
2. [GHSA-mm6c-35cm-g4x2: RiscZeroGroth16Verifier accepts a chosen invalid ReceiptClaim](https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-mm6c-35cm-g4x2)
3. [risc0 PR #3831: Release 3.1.0, circuit soundness fixes and new Groth16 setup](https://github.com/risc0/risc0/pull/3831)
4. [risc0-ethereum PR #748: record estops of superseded 3.1.0 verifier and 0.9.0 set verifier](https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/pull/748)
5. [RISC Zero docs: Verifier Contracts](https://dev.risczero.com/api/blockchain-integration/contracts/verifier)

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