{
  "slug": "bitcoin-core-discloses-three-cves-fixed-in-29-2-and-30-0",
  "title": "Bitcoin Core discloses three CVEs fixed in 29.2 and 30.0",
  "summary": "On 10 Nov 2026 Bitcoin Core disclosed one high and two medium CVEs fixed in 29.2 and 30.0. Miners, and operators with a -whitelist range covering their Tor daemon, should check their version and config now.",
  "desk": "Bitcoin",
  "tags": [
    "Bitcoin Core 29.2",
    "CVE-2025-62861",
    "TRUC",
    "testnet5",
    "anti-exfil signing"
  ],
  "format": "news",
  "published_at": "2026-11-17T15:37:02.006Z",
  "url": "https://blog.b3pay.net/bitcoin-core-discloses-three-cves-fixed-in-29-2-and-30-0",
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  "key_points": [
    "CVE-2025-62861 (high) leaves a mining node unable to build block templates after certain reorgs until it restarts; it affects 28.0 to 28.2 and 29.0 to 29.1.",
    "CVE-2025-62860 (medium) gives inbound Tor peers -whitelist rights when the Tor daemon's address falls inside the configured range.",
    "CVE-2025-62859 (medium) lets the first peer to announce a compact block stall block processing for 10 minutes, repeatably in some setups.",
    "Optech #431 also covers unaudited anti-exfil signing drafts, the testnet5 genesis plan at block 975,744, and a compact block regression caused by rune-mint chains."
  ],
  "sources": [
    {
      "title": "Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #431",
      "url": "https://bitcoinops.org/en/newsletters/2026/11/13/"
    },
    {
      "title": "CVE-2025-62861 - Block template creation halted by TRUC sibling eviction during reorg",
      "url": "https://bitcoincore.org/en/2026/11/10/disclose-cve-2025-62861/"
    },
    {
      "title": "CVE-2025-62860 - Inbound Tor connections wrongly receive -whitelist permissions",
      "url": "https://bitcoincore.org/en/2026/11/10/disclose-cve-2025-62860/"
    },
    {
      "title": "CVE-2025-62859 - Block processing stall via witness malleation",
      "url": "https://bitcoincore.org/en/2026/11/10/disclose-cve-2025-62859/"
    },
    {
      "title": "BIP95: Add testnet5 genesis parameters (bitcoin/bips PR #2356)",
      "url": "https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/2356"
    },
    {
      "title": "AvilaLabs/anti-exfil: draft BIPs for anti-exfil signing",
      "url": "https://github.com/AvilaLabs/anti-exfil"
    }
  ],
  "content_markdown": "Bitcoin Core published three security advisories on 10 November 2026: CVE-2025-62861 (high) and CVE-2025-62860 and CVE-2025-62859 (medium), all fixed in 29.2 and 30.0. Anyone still on a 28.x or 29.x release, all now end of life, should move to a maintained release; miners and nodes that set `-whitelist` should check first.\n\n## Bitcoin Core CVE-2025-62861, -62860 and -62859 at a glance\n\nBitcoin Optech Newsletter #431 (13 November) summarizes the disclosure that Antoine Poinsot posted to the Bitcoin-Dev list. Under Core's disclosure policy, medium and high severity bugs go public two weeks after the last affected release reaches end of life. The 29.x series reached that point on 27 October, which is why the details came out on 10 November. The three bugs were reported between April and September 2025 and fixed in 2025 releases.\n\n| CVE | Severity | Who is hit | Affected versions | Fix |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| CVE-2025-62861 | High | Nodes used for mining | 28.0 to 28.2, 29.0 to 29.1 | PR #33504 (28.3, 29.2, 30.0) |\n| CVE-2025-62860 | Medium | Nodes with a non-default `-whitelist` range that matches the Tor daemon's address | Before 28.3, 29.2 and 30.0 | PR #33395 (28.3, 29.2, 30.0) |\n| CVE-2025-62859 | Medium | Any node; worst with `-blocksonly` or when an attacker holds your 3 high-bandwidth peers | Before 29.2 and 30.0 | PR #32646 (29.2, 30.0) |\n\n**CVE-2025-62861.** TRUC (version 3) transactions may have at most one unconfirmed ancestor and one unconfirmed descendant (BIP 431). These are mempool policy rules, so a block can contain a TRUC parent with several children. After a reorg, Core re-adds the disconnected block's transactions with `bypass_limits=true`, but the sibling-eviction branch did not check that flag. It could evict a restored transaction and leave its descendants in the mempool. The assembled block template then fails its validity check. The node cannot produce blocks until a restart reloads the mempool consistently. The fix gates the TRUC checks on `bypass_limits`.\n\n**CVE-2025-62860.** Inbound Tor peers appear to come from the Tor daemon's IP. If that address fell inside a `-whitelist` range, every Tor peer got the whitelist's lifted DoS limits and weaker privacy-leak mitigations. The advisory says popular vendors bundled Core with a Tor daemon and set exactly such a range, and that thousands of reachable mainnet nodes were affected. Fixed versions never whitelist connections received on an onion bind. Nodes that never set `-whitelist` were never affected.\n\n**CVE-2025-62859.** Core cleared the compact block download state after reconstruction but before the witness malleation check. If the check failed, it fell back to `GETDATA` to the same peer with a 10-minute timeout. A peer that announced first could stall the block for those 10 minutes. With control of the victim's 3 high-bandwidth peers, or against a `-blocksonly` node, it could repeat the stall indefinitely.\n\n## Who should act, and what the old releases cost\n\nThe real risk is uneven. CVE-2025-62861 matters to pools and solo miners that build templates from Core on 28.0 to 29.1. A reorg that restores an invalid TRUC shape could stop block production until someone notices and restarts. The advisory's own remedy for the symptom is a restart. In my assessment, a pool with a watchdog on template creation would have recovered quickly, but one without would lose blocks silently.\n\nCVE-2025-62860 is a configuration trap. A `-whitelist` range was often a requirement for client software next to Core, so operators set it and forgot it. The fix removes the problem for onion binds. It does not remove the need to keep that range narrow.\n\nSince every affected series is now end of life, there is no patch to apply on 28.x or 29.x. The only fix is a different release line, and the Core lifecycle page lists which ones are maintained.\n\n## Checks to run on your node before upgrading\n\nThese commands use standard Core RPC and options. I did not run them, so adapt them to your setup.\n\n```\nbitcoind -version\nbitcoin-cli getnetworkinfo | jq .subversion\ngrep -n whitelist bitcoin.conf\nbitcoin-cli getpeerinfo | jq '.[] | select(.inbound and (.permissions | length > 0)) | {addr, network, permissions}'\n```\n\n1. If `subversion` shows 28.0 to 28.2 or 29.0 to 29.1 and the node feeds a miner, upgrade first.\n2. If `bitcoin.conf` has a `whitelist=` range that includes your Tor daemon's address, list the inbound peers that carry permissions. Any Tor peer with permissions is the CVE-2025-62860 symptom.\n3. After upgrading, put Tor inbound traffic on an onion bind so fixed versions never whitelist it. Narrow the range to the addresses you really trust.\n4. If a miner stops producing templates after a reorg on an old release, restart `bitcoind`.\n\n## Other items in Optech #431\n\n**Anti-exfil signing drafts.** Connor Avila posted two draft BIPs. The first defines a two-round protocol for Schnorr and ECDSA in which the host adds its own randomness to the nonce and checks that the device used it. The second adds three per-input PSBT fields. The repository has test vectors, a Python reference and a C module for libsecp256k1. The repo describes the work as having had no cryptographer review and no outside audit. Sjors Provoost's experimental single-signer taproot key-path draft is to be aligned with it. BIP461, which helps detect key-leak attempts, is already merged. These are drafts, so no wallet should ship them as a standard yet.\n\n**Testnet5 genesis.** Anthony Towns plans to start mining the testnet5 genesis block after mainnet reaches block 975,744, expected on 13 November. The genesis block will commit to a mainnet block hash at or after that height, so nobody can pre-mine. Minimum difficulty is about a million times testnet4's, so the first blocks need ASICs, and a public pool is planned. The BIP95 placeholders are replaced after mining, and the BIPs pull request #2356 (add testnet5 genesis parameters) is where that lands. Node software still needs testnet5 parameters, BIP54 consensus cleanup logic, DNS seeds, faucets and explorers. Do not point CI at testnet5 yet.\n\n**Compact block regression.** From mid-July to mid-October, 0xB10C's nodes reconstructed only 1% to 5% of blocks without requesting transactions, at about 100 kB requested per block. Chains of rune-mint transactions caused it. Each was about 100 vbytes, paid about 10 sat in fees and used pay-to-anchor inputs and outputs. Other peers sent transactions that spent a P2A output mid-chain and paid its whole value as fees, replacing the rest of the chain. Which version a node kept depended on arrival order, so mempools diverged from what pools mined. My reading is that this is a policy-divergence problem, not a compact block bug, so a Core upgrade alone would not fix it.\n\n## Caveats\n\nThe advisories describe the bugs and fixes, but they give no exploitation figures. The compact block analysis comes from forum investigations, not a Core release note. Testnet5 is not ready for general use until node support lands.",
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